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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
DAVID P. HOCHSTETLER AKA )
DAVID PAUL-WHITESTORM
)
HOCHSTETLER,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
)

NO. 46222-2018
ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-17-46726

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
David Hochstetler contends the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence in this case, particularly in regard to its decision to make this sentence
consecutive to another, unrelated sentence. Specifically, it did not exercise reason when it told
Mr. Hochstetler that, absent misconduct by him while incarcerated, the new consecutive sentence
would not subject him to additional time in jail, but would only increase the time he was on
supervised release. That justification was flawed because the fixed term of the new sentence
meant Mr. Hochstetler would spend more time in prison regardless of his behavior and the
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district court could not guarantee that the parole board would let Mr. Hochstetler out on parole at
the end of his fixed term.
Since the district court did not reach its decision to impose a consecutive sentence in an
exercise of reason, this Court should either reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate or,
alternatively, remand this case for a new sentencing hearing.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Hochstetler pled guilty to felony malicious injury to property and agreed to pay
restitution in an amount to be determined at a later time.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.5, Ls.12-14, p.6,

Ls.8-11.)1 He admitted he and his uncle had gone out over a period of time, during which they
had taken turns indiscriminately firing a BB gun from their car, hitting several windows, signs,
or cars in the process.

(See Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.)

In

exchange for his plea, the State agreed not to file any other charges in this matter and to
recommend a unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed, which would run concurrent to
an unrelated sentence for which he had been on parole at the time of this offense. (Tr., Vol.1,
p.5, L.21 - p.6, L.6.) Mr. Hochstetler joined the State’s recommendation that the sentence should
be concurrent to his other sentence. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.13, Ls.5-7.)
Mr. Hochstetler accepted responsibility and expressed remorse for his actions.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.14, Ls.19-25; PSI, p.4.) To that end, he explained he wanted to pay his share of the
restitution, which, according to the State’s request, totaled nearly $54,000. (Tr., Vol.2, p.10,
Ls.3-5, p.13, Ls.7-9.) He noted that he should have an ability to make payments in that regard,
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The transcripts in this case are provided in two separately bound and paginated volumes. To
avoid confusion, “Vol.1” will refer to the volume containing the transcript of the Change of Plea
hearing held on January 30, 2018, and “Vol.2” will refer to the volume containing the transcript
of the sentencing hearing held on April 19, 2018.
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as he had employment prospects available to him. (Tr., Vol.2, p.13, Ls.16-25.) For example, he
has some training as an Emergency Medical Technician. (PSI, p.10.)
Mr. Hochstetler also explained that he had been struggling with his mental health issues
at the time, though he acknowledged this did not excuse his behavior.

(Tr., Vol.2, p.12,

Ls.14-18; see also PSI, p.15 (the PSI author noting Mr. Hochstetler had been struggling to
maintain housing on parole due to behavioral issues).) Most recently, Mr. Hochstetler has been
diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder and adjustment disorder. (PSI, p.38.) He admitted to police
officers that he was not on his medications at the time of the offense. (PSI, p.3.)
The district court acknowledged Mr. Hochstetler’s mental health issues, though it was
concerned about his ability to remain complaint with his medication regimen. (Tr., Vol.2, p.16,
L.20 - p.17, L.5.) It also was concerned that Mr. Hochstetler was minimizing his role in the
events. (Tr., Vol.2, p.15, L.1 - p.16, L.9.) As a result, the district court imposed and executed a
unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed. (Tr., Vol.2, p.17, Ls.12-15.) It rejected the
joint recommendation for that sentence to be concurrent with his other sentence, and instead
made it consecutive so that “you are eligible for supervision a little longer than you otherwise
would be.” (Tr., Vol.2, p.17, Ls.15-25.) The district court explained that this sentence “doesn’t
mean that you have to spend additional time in prison unless your conduct keeps you there.”
(Tr., p.17, Ls.23-25.)
Mr. Hochstetler filed a notice of appeal timely from the resulting judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.46-48, 207-08.)

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence on
Mr. Hochstetler.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence On
Mr. Hochstetler
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the
public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982). Accordingly, in order
to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentencing decision, he must show that, in
light of the governing criteria, the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts.
State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997); see also Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856,
863-64 (2018) (a district court abuses its discretion when it fails to recognize the issue is one of
discretion, it does not act within the outer bounds of that discretion, it acts inconsistent with the
applicable legal standards, or it does not reach its decision in an exercise of reason).
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are:

(1) protection of society;

(2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and
(4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).
The protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider.
Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).

State v.

The Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that

rehabilitation is the first means the district court should consider to achieve that goal. See
State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in State v.
Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).
The district court did not reach its decision to make Mr. Hochstetler’s sentence in this
case consecutive through an exercise of reason. That is because the justifications the district
court gave for the consecutive sentence – that it “doesn’t mean that you have to spend additional
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time in prison unless your conduct keeps you there,” that it only means “you are eligible for
supervision a little longer than you otherwise would be” (Tr., Vol.2, p.17, Ls.15-25) – are not
reconcilable with the applicable standards.
First, when serving consecutive sentences, the defendant will serve the fixed time on the
first sentence, then the fixed time on the second sentence, and only then will he become parole
eligible. Fullmer v. Collard, 143 Idaho 171, 172 (Ct. App. 2006). That means Mr. Hochstetler
would have to serve the one year of fixed time imposed by the new sentence before he would
become eligible for parole, regardless of how well he behaved while incarcerated. See id.
Therefore, the district court’s justification that the consecutive sentence “doesn’t mean that you
have to spend additional time in prison unless your conduct keeps you there” was irrational.
Second, while it is not inappropriate to consider the fixed portion of the sentence as the
time the defendant will probably be confined, State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 727 (2007), the
reality is that whether or not a person is released on parole is left completely to the discretion of
the parole board. State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931 (2005). This is, in fact, the reason the
appellate courts consider the total term of the defendant’s sentence, not just the fixed term, when
they review a sentence. Oliver, 144 Idaho at 727. More importantly, the parole board considers
more than just the person’s behavior while incarcerated in deciding whether to parole someone;
it also considers such factors as the person’s criminal history; program participation, compliance,
and completion; and other individual characteristics “related to the likelihood of offending in the
future.” I.C. § 20-223(6). Thus, the implication in the district court’s justification – that the
parole board would release Mr. Hochstetler to parole at the end of his fixed time if he behaved
properly – was irrational, since the district court could not guarantee the parole board would
exercise its discretion in that manner.
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Finally, justifying a sentence as simply providing a longer time to keep the person under
IDOC’s supervision is inconsistent with the principle that sentences are to be crafted so that they
do not force the prison system to continue detaining a person once rehabilitation or age has
decreased the risk of recidivism. 2 State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988). Since
neither of the district court’s justifications for making the sentence consecutive are consistent
with the applicable standards, the consecutive sentence is excessive.
Rather, a sufficient consideration of the mitigating factors in this case reveals that the
new sentence should have been, as both parties recommended, run concurrently with
Mr. Hochstetler’s other sentence. Mr. Hochstetler was remorseful for his conduct, and was at
least taking the first steps toward accepting responsibility for it. (Compare Tr., Vol.2, p.14,
Ls.19-25 (defense counsel noting that Mr. Hochstetler did accept responsibility for his actions);
with Tr., Vol.2, p.15, L.1 - p.16, L.9 (the district court expressing concerns that Mr. Hochstetler
was still minimizing his role in the events).) Those are both important first steps toward
rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010). In fact, he demonstrated
his desire to take those steps by expressing his willingness to pay his share of the significant
restitution owing in this case. See I.C. § 19-2521(2)(f); State v. Hall, 114 Idaho 887, 889
(Ct. App. 1988). He also acknowledged his struggles with his mental health issues, and the
record indicates that, when he is properly medicated, he is capable of being a contributing
member of society. (PSI, p.10 (noting Mr. Hochstetler has training as an EMT).)
Therefore, the sentence that would best protect society would be a concurrent one, as that
would actually allow for the possibility of a timely release back to parole without the additional
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While the parole board may discharge a parolee early, that decision is a discretionary one; it is
not required grant requests for early discharge. See I.C. § 20-233.
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year of required incarceration (which the district court’s statements suggest it did not want to
subject Mr. Hochstetler to in the first place). At that time, terms could be crafted to continue
promoting his rehabilitation, such as by helping him overcome his issues with sticking to his
medication regimen. Moreover, the concurrent sentence would accomplish those goals without
potentially requiring the Department of Correction to keep him under the restrictions of
supervision once those rehabilitative efforts took hold. As such, the district court abused its
discretion by failing to reach its decision to order the new sentence to be served consecutively in
an exercise of reason.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hochstetler respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 14th day of March, 2019.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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